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I. INTRODUCTION
Developing countries have entered into a large number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), free trade agreements (FTAs), and regional
trade agreements (RTAs) that, among other matters, include provisions
for the protection of foreign investors' on the basis of most-favorednation and national treatment principles. Under these agreements, host
countries assume broad obligations for the protection of foreign investments, particularly against expropriation and strife.
Policies welcoming foreign investments have become a common
feature in developing countries in the last fifteen years after the failure of
attempts to impose some forms of control over the activities of
transnational corporations and the flows of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and technology.2 Investment agreements have been regarded by

*

Director, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies on Industrial Property and Economics,

Faculty of Law, University of Buenos Aires. Director of the South Centre project on Intellectual Property and Innovation.
1.
RTAs containing rules on investment usually include provisions on the right to
establish a presence in countries members to the RTA, and protection principles found in
BITs. OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 65 (2003).
2.
Negotiations on a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations and on an
International Code on Transfer of Technology were launched during the late 1970's, but
collapsed due to the resistance of developed countries. See CARLOS CORREA & NAGESH
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some developing countries as an instrument to attract foreign investors.
The number of BITs quintupled during the last decade, rising from 385
at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s, while the
number of countries involved in bilateral investment treaties reached
173. By 2002, 2,181 BITs had been established. 3 There are more than
172 RTAs in force; a small (albeit growing) minority of them also deal
with investment issues.
Despite expectations about the impact of BITs on FDI, there is no
evidence indicating that the adoption of BITs has actually encouraged
FDI flows to signing developing countries. While half of Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Members' FDI
into developing countries was covered by a BIT by 2000, the increase in
FDI flows to these countries was accounted for by additional country
pairs entering into agreements rather than signatory hosts gaining significant additional foreign direct investment.5 BITs, FTAs, and RTAs,
however, permit developed countries who are partners to the agreement
to influence the domestic political economy of developing countries and
to advance the interests of their corporations in the latter markets. The
establishment of BITs and investment rules in FTAs has strategic value
for developed countries, especially the major capital exporters. Though
not all investment agreements ensure market access (to the extent that
pre-establishment rights are not recognized),6 they provide broad postestablishment rights, including in some cases the possibility of directly
bringing complaints against host States and obtaining compensation.
The United States started to include provisions on intellectual property
KUMAR, ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT: TRADE-RELATED
INVESTMENT MEASURES

3.

(TRIM)

3 (2003).
(UNCTAD),

AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ch.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.

WORLD INVEST-

2003, FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003); UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999 (2000).
4.
OECD, supra note 1, at 65.
MENT REPORT,

5.

MARY HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, WORLD BANK DEV. ECON. RESEARCH GROUP, Do

FDI? ONLY A BIT ... AND THEY COULD BITE
(2003).
6.
See, however, the U.S. Model BIT of 2004, which applies the national treatment
principle to the establishment of foreign investors. Update of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (released Feb. 5, 2004), art. 3, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/
38602.htm [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
7.
The scope and content of BITs have been standardized over the years. The wording
of individual provisions still varies in some cases, while differences are most significant between BITs signed some decades ago and those signed more recently. The main provisions
deal with the scope and definition of foreign investment; admission and establishment; national treatment in the post-establishment phase; MFN treatment; fair and equitable treatment;
guarantees and compensation in the event of expropriation; guarantees of free transfers of
funds and repatriations of capital and profits; and dispute settlement provisions, both StateState and investor-State. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, 2003, FDI POLICIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 89 (2003).
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ATTRACT
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rights (IPRs) in its bilateral investment treaty program during the 1980s;
at that time the United States was also pushing for the negotiation of the
TRIPS Agreement and forcing advanced developing countries, such as
South Korea and Brazil, to bilaterally negotiate higher standards of IPRs
protection.8
OECD countries attempted to develop a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) in the 1990's, but after significant divergences among
OECD countries and opposition from civil society, the initiative collapsed. An attempt is currently underway to incorporate, as one of the
"Singapore issues," investment rules in :the already burdened agenda of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The outcome of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, however, shows a strong resistance by
developing countries to accept new disciplines on investment as a component of the WTO system.
While negotiations on intellectual property rights in the WTO are
virtually paralyzed, and the launching of negotiations on investment
finds strong opposition, developed countries, particularly the United
States, have turned to bilateral dealings to advance their industries' economic interests and obtain WTO-plus concessions from developing
countries. The United States has concluded BITs 9 with a large number of
countries (see Table 1) and several FTAs' 0 including rules on investment
(as well as IPRs) with Australia, Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Morocco, and
the Central American countries. There are ongoing negotiations with
Bahrain, the Southern African Customs Union, Thailand, and three Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia).

8.
Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property's Empire: The Role of FTAs (November 2003), availableat http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=28.
In February 2004, the U.S. State Department released a draft-text of its revised BIT
9.
template that was adopted in November, 2004, supra note 6. The new model BIT includes
extensive transparency commitments on the part of host governments, incorporates a range of
changes to the investor-state dispute settlement process, adds new language to clarify the
meaning of certain substantive provisions, including those on expropriation and the minimum
standard of treatment-in line with earlier U.S. FrAs-includes provisions on labor and the
environment, and contemplates the creation of a future appellate body or mechanism that
would provide a means for review of arbitral awards. See U.S. Releases Draft-Text of Revised
Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, INVEST-SD: INVESTMENT L. AND POL'Y WKLY. NEWS
BULL. (Int'l Inst. on Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Can.), Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://
www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment-investsdfeb23-2004.pdf.
The Bush Administration also revised the investment template used in U.S. FTAs as
10.
per a series of requirements set down by the U.S. Congress.
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TABLE I
UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES*

Country

Date of

Date Entered

Signature

into Force

11, 1995
November 14,1991
September 23, 1992
I August 1,1997
September 29, 1999
March 12,1986
January 15,1994 [
April 17,1998
September 23, 1992
February 26,1986
August 3, 1984

January 4, 1998
October20,199
March 29, 1996
August 2, 2001
May 30, 2001
_July 25,1989
N/A'
June 6,2001
June 2, 1994
April 6,1989
July 28, 1989

..
Albania .January
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
'Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
[Bolivia

Bulgaria

[
[

r
f

lCameroon
Congo, Democratic
jRepublic of the 2
Congo, Republic of
February 12, 1990
August 13, 1994
1the (Brazzaville)
.
lCroatia
July 13, 1996-F June 20, 2001
ICzech Republic 3
October 22, 1991 December 19,1992
Ecuador
August27, 1993
May 11, 1997
lEgypt
March 11, 1986
June 27, 1992
[El Salvador
March 10, 1999
N/A'
jEstonia
April 19, 1994
February 16, 1997
(Georgia
March 7, 1994
August 17, 1997
[Grenada
May 2,1986
March 3,1989
Haiti
[ December13,1 983
N/A'
Honduras
July 1, 1995
July 11,2001

j

Jamaica

I February 4, 1994

Jordan
Kazakhstan
[Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco

July 2,1997
June 12, 2003
May 19,1992 F January 12,1994
I January 19, 1993 1 January 12, 1994
I January 13,1995 [December26, 1996
I January 14,1998 November 22, 2001
April 21, 1993
November 25, 1994
October 6,1994
January 1, 1997
July22, 1985
May29, 1991

March 7, 1997
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Country

December 1,1998

Mozambique
Nicaragua
Panama
Panama
(Amendment)

Poland

Date of
Signature

....

Date Entered
into Force
N..
IA.

,1995
July. !.

N/A6

October 27,1982

May 30, 1991

June 1, 2000

May 14, 2001

March 21, 1990

August 6,1994

!Romania

May 28,1992.

January 15,1994

Russia

June 17,1992

N/A'

Senegal

December 6,1983

October 25, 1990

,Slovakia'

October 22, 1991

December 19,1992

Sri Lanka

September 20, 1991

May 1,1993

[Trinidad & Tobago

September 26, 1994 1December 26,1996;

Tunisia

May 15,1990

February 7,1993

Turkey
Ukraine

December 3,1985
March 4, 1994

May 18,1990
November 16,1996

'zbekistan

N/A'
16, 1994 .December

'Source: Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Fact Sheet.,
1U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, Washington, DC., July

1,o2003

Although investment agreements do not include detailed regulations
on IPR, they incorporate a broad definition of "investment" that generally covers such rights. Such agreements may thus influence the exercise
of IPRs laws and in particular the capacity of host countries to control
the acquisition and use of IPRs by foreign title-holders.
Can the exercise of any of the key provisions in investment
agreements" lead to rights and practices that deviate from the terms of
the TRIPS Agreement? This issue is specifically explored in relation to
compulsory licenses,' 2 one of the "safeguards" contemplated in the
TRIPS Agreement that developing countries have actively tried to
There has been no attempt to review the large number of investment agreements
11.
adopted or in force. The study is based rather on a sample of provisions identified in agreements entered into with different developed countries. Given the extensive use of "model" BIT
agreements and of pre-existing FTAs to negotiate new ones, it is expected that the study will
provide a fairly comprehensive analysis of the subject.
This discussion is also relevant for cases of non-commercial government use of
12.
IPRs.
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preserve in order to mitigate the powers conferred to patent owners.13
Despite this attention and interest, no single compulsory license has been
granted in a developing country after the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement. This article explores the extent to which investment
protection may add another barrier for such a use and how to deal with
this problem. Part II examines the definition of "investment" and the
modalities of IPRs included therein. Part III briefly deals with the
application of the national treatment, most-favored-nation, and the "fair
and equitable" principles. Part IV identifies issues emerging from the
potential application of expropriation rules to compulsory licenses, and
Part V discusses conclusions that can be drawn from these issues.
II.

WHAT QUALIFIES AS AN "INVESTMENT"?

A. Assets as Investment

As contained in BITs, the Energy Charter Treaty, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and recently negotiated FTAs,
"investment" is an all-encompassing concept including almost any kind
of business activity. The definition of "investment" is generally based on
the concept of asset. All assets of an enterprise, such as movable and
immovable property, equity in companies, claims to money, contractual
rights, intellectual property rights, concessions, licenses and similar
rights are included. This concept is broader than FDI, as it encompasses
portfolio investments.1 4 Box 1 contains, as an example, the definition of
"investment" incorporated into the recent Chile-United States FTA.

13.
See, e.g., Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Nov. 9-14 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minOl_e/mindecle.pdf, which
confirmed the right to issue compulsory licenses and determine the grounds thereof.
14.
See UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at 174, U.N. Sales No. E.96.H.A.14
(1996). Some
agreements, however, are limited to foreign direct investments. See, e.g., the agreement between EFTA and Mexico of 2000, which applies to "investment for the purpose of establishing
lasting economic relations with an undertaking such as, in particular, investments which give
the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the management thereof." Free Trade
Agreement Between EFTA and Mexico, Nov. 27, 2000, EFTA-Mex., art. 45, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/mexefta/mexefta.asp.
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Box i
INVESTMENT UNDER THE CHILE-USA

FTA

INVESTMENT INCLUDES:

(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession,
revenue-sharing and other similar contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits and similar rights conferred pursuant to applicable domestic law, and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages,
liens, and pledges.
Some investment agreements generally refer to IPRs, while others
explicitly indicate the types of covered IPRs. For instance, the BIT between the United States and El Salvador specifies that "investment"
includes "copyrights and related rights, patents, rights in plant varieties,
industrial designs, rights in semiconductor layout designs, trade secrets,
business information, trade and
including know-how and confidential
'5
service marks, and trade names.'

1

In some investment agreements, reference is also made to "technical
process"' 6 or "know how"'7 and "goodwill."'" An open question is the
U.S.-El Salvador Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. I(d), Mar. 10, 1999, available at
15.
http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/usasal-e.asp.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
16.
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. I(a)(iv), Jan. -4, 1996, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-azerbaijan.pdf ("goodwill, technical processes
and know-how").
See, e.g., Agreement Between EFrA and Singapore, June 26, 2002, EFTA-Sing.,
17.
art. 37, available at http://secretariat.efta.intWeb/ExtemalRelations/PartnerCountfies/
Singapore [hereinafter EFTA-Singapore BIT] ("technical know-how and goodwill").
According to current IPRs law, secret "technical process" or "know how" may be
18.
protected as trade secrets or undisclosed information. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
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extent to which modalities of IPRs not existing at the time of entry into
an investment agreement (such as plant varieties protection)' 9 would be
covered investments. An affirmative reply to this question may be
grounded on the fact that investment agreements are intended to protect
current and future investments, or on the application of catch-all provisions embracing (such as in the example above) any other "intangible
property."
Investment agreements protect assets under the direct or indirect
control of foreign investors. National laws differ on what "control"
means. There is no international standard to judge when certain types of
rights, or even a de facto situation, may be considered as equivalent to an
actual control over assets. In addition to the difficulties in determining
when control exists, a broad concept of "indirect" ownership or control
may lead to the protection of investors who lack a substantial business
activity in the host country, such as when an investment is made by a
firm established in another contracting party but owned or controlled by
a party in a non-contracting party. 20
Given the broad coverage of these definitions, some investment
agreements, like NAFTA Chapter 11,21 include a general rule accompanied by an illustrative list of covered investments, as well as a "negative"
list of areas specifically excluded from the scope of the agreement.22 In
the negotiation of the draft MAI, a proposal was made to include an interpretive note indicating that in order to qualify as an investment,
certain characteristics must be present, such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption

of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 31 I.L.M. 81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips e/
t agmOe.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. "Goodwill" is the benefit and advantage of the
good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It may be protected under unfair competition law (which condemns dishonest commercial practices) or, in common-law countries,
under the doctrine of "passing-off' (the wrong of misrepresenting one's business goods or
services as another's, to the latter's injury, generally by using a confusingly similar trademark
or trade name). Protection often encompasses not only the use of trademarks, but also of a
particular packaging, "get up" or "trade dress," and advertising styles.
19.
Most developing countries that introduced plant variety protection did it during the
last ten years, in some cases after having entered into FrAs; Mexico is one example.
20.
This issue was discussed during the negotiation of the draft MAI. See OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment-Commentary to the MAI Negotiating Text 5 (Apr. 24,
1998) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/27/2758531 .pdf.
21.
The North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
1101.2, 32 I.L.M. 289, [hereinafter NAFrA].
22.
Id.
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of risk.23 This characterization appears in recent FTAs such as in the
24
Chile-United States FTA and in the U.S. Model BIT.
These characteristics would exclude from the definition trade opera25
tions and financial transactions as such. Claims to money and any form
of credit may be covered assets, however; therefore, the definition would
apply to the rights arising from trade transactions or from bank operations, including bank deposits. Moreover, case law under NAFITA seems
to indicate the troubling trend of considering some of those features as
sufficient to define, by themselves, when a covered investment exists;
one example is when the expectation of a market share is frustrated. In
S.D. Myers v. Canada the Tribunal ruled the scope of "investment" includes such assets as market share in a sector and access to markets in
the host state, whether or not the investor owns a physical plant or retail
store in that country. In short, almost any kind of business activity can
constitute an investment that is subject to protection."
B. IPRs as Investment
IPRs are deemed an "investment" in investment agreements, which
generally include a specific reference to that effect. In the absence of
8
exceptions or other specifications, the usual broad "assets" definition
would cover any type of IPRs acquired in the host country, including
9
those that are not specifically dealt with under the TRIPS Agreement. A
number of questions may arise with regard to the scope of the definition.
Unregistered IPRs such as copyright and trade secret protection do
not require registration to confer rights against third parties. The lack of
23.

Manfred Schekulin, Scope of the MAI: Definition of Investor and Investment, in

THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF FEBRUARY

1997 12

(OECD Working Papers v. 5, no. 18, 1997).
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6.
24.
See, e.g, the clarification contained in the Canada-Costa Rica BIT. Canada-Costa
25.
Rica Bilateral Investment Treaty, Mar. 18, 1998, art. 1, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
bitse.asp#CAN.
S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 232, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Nov. 13, 2000, available at
26.
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/SDM-archive-en.asp (stating, in a NAFTA arbitration under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, that Myers' market share in Canada constituted an
investment). See also Pope Talbot v. Canada, para. 96, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Apr. 10, 2001,
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/pope-archive-en.asp (defining access

to U.S. markets by a foreign investment as a protected property interest).
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD), PRIVATE
27.
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS-A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR
RIGHTS 23 (2001).

For instance, during discussions of the draft MAI, some delegations proposed ex28.
cluding copyrights and neighboring rights, as well as databases. See MAI, supra note 20, at

117.
Examples include utility models, breeders' rights, data bases, and digital manage29.
ment rights.
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registration does not seem to affect the status of such rights as covered
investments. As noted, some BITs and FTAs explicitly mention these
categories of non-registered rights.
Certain IPRs require the holder to apply for them; patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and other IPRs can only be acquired through a
registration process, upon demand by the interested party. 30 The right is
conferred once the application is processed and approved. Thus, a patent
application creates a mere expectation of obtaining an exclusive right
and, hence, a profit. Patent applications, however, may be traded and, in
some countries, patent applications generate rights even before they are
granted, such as the ability to act against infringers. Though it is clear
that a still-unregistered invention is not an IPR, it may be argued that the
application is, in any case, an "intangible property" as long as it is
"owned" and can be assigned to third parties. Further, some
investment
agreements 3' refer in the definition of "investment" to "rights with respect to copyrights, patents .... This wording may be intended to
encompass not only granted rights but also applications.
A third area at issue in IPRs involves cases in which the subject matter is unprotected in the host country but is protected elsewhere. This
situation may arise when, for example: (a) the IPR owner in a foreign
country has not claimed his rights in the host country3 3; (b) the IPRs have
expired or have been revoked in the host country, while still valid in foreign countries; or (c) the subject matter is deemed not protectable in the
host country, such as in the case of countries applying the exception allowed by Article 27. 3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement for plant and animals
or refusing patents on merely isolated genes.
Because IPRs are granted on a territorial basis, subject matter excluded from protection in a country belongs to the public domain there.
It cannot be deemed an asset owned or controlled by a juridical or natural person. In the case of well known trademarks, however, which receive
protection without prior registration, Article 16.2 of the TRIPs Agree30.
It should be noted that in countries of common law tradition, trademarks may be
acquired simply by use of the sign, without formal registration.
31.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Argentina for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 5,
1991, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#ARG.
32.
Id., art. 1(a)(iv); cf with, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and
the Government of Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
l(f)(v), May 29, 1996, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#CAN (defining "investment" as including IPR, and IPR as including "copyright and related rights" as well as other
rights).
33.
This is a very common situation. For instance, developing countries only receive a
fraction (in some cases a very minor one) of patent applications made in the United States or
Europe. See WIPO Industrial Property Statistics, availableat http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/.
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ment is one exception. Recent FTAs have not only confirmed this exception but expanded it beyond the TRIPS standard, by incorporation of
WIPO's Joint Recommendation on provisions relating to well-known
trademarks.34

III.

THE APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES: NATIONAL
TREATMENT, MOST-FAVORED NATION, AND

"FAIR AND EQUITABLE"
A. The National Treatment Principle

The national treatment principle is well established in IPRs law.
Since the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, it has become a standard feature in most
national IPRs
international agreements35 on IPRs as well as of most
37
Agreement.
TRIPS
36
the
in
incorporated
laws. It is also
The adoption of the national treatment principle in the TRIPS
Agreement as well as in other international agreements on IPRs (such as
the Paris, Berne, and Rome Conventions, as well as the Washington
Treaty), however, is subject to a number of carefully negotiated and
38
drafted exceptions. In contrast, no exceptions have been contemplated
in investments agreements, even though conceivably they would be
needed to protect particular interests of contracting parties.
For instance, according to Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the national treatment principle only applies "in respect of performers,
producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations with regard to

WIPO JOINT RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING TRADEMARK LICENSES (Oct. 3,
34.
2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development iplaw/index.htm. See, e.g.,
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov2004, art. 17.2.9, available at
ernment of the Republic of Chile, Chile-U.S., Jan. 2 1,
3
.
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chiusa-e/chiusaind-e.asp#
A noticeable exception is the UPOV Convention, which adopted a reciprocity prin35.
ciple. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 1, 1961,
revised Oct. 23, 1978, art. 3, available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/
1978/w-up780_.htm.
Some laws, however, require reciprocity. See, e.g., U.S. Semiconductor Chip Pro36.
tection Act (SCPA), 17 U.S.C. 901ff, 902(a)(2) (1984) (although the U.S. law in this respect
was superseded by the TRIPS Agreement, which requires Members to grant national treatment).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 3.
37.
See, e.g., id. at art. 3.1 ("Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
38.
Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to
the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions ... provided in ...the Paris
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits....")
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the rights provided under this Agreement."3 9 This means that Members
may discriminate with regard to other rights, such as the participation of
local and foreign performers in funds generated by levies on blank tapes.
It is unclear the extent to which an exception of this type would survive
the all-encompassing national treatment principle as applied in the context of investment agreements. Could a foreign performer successfully
claim that denial of national treatment discriminates him as an "investor"?
It may be argued that protected rights are only those conferred under the
domestic law. The solution to this and similar cases may remain an open
question until the issue is clarified by case law.
B. The Most-Favored-NationClause

The Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause was not present in preTRIPS international conventions on IPRs. It was incorporated in Article
4 of the TRIPS Agreement with a number of exceptions.40 This provision
means, for instance, that should most-advantageous conditions be
granted to the members of a regional agreement (established after the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement), such conditions must be extended, automatically and unconditionally, to all WTO Members.
The MFN clause in the context of investment agreements obliges the
host country to extend to investors from the contracting party treatment
no less favorable than it accords to investors from other countries. Different formulations of this clause may be found in investment
agreements. While the MFN clause aims at creating equality of competitive opportunities between investors from different foreign countries, it
limits host countries' room for maneuvering with respect to future investment agreements, as it obliges a host country to extend unilaterally
to investors from treaty partners any additional rights that that host coun4
try grants to third countries in future agreements. '

39.
Id.
40.
Id. at art. 4 ("Exempted from the MFN obligation are any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity accorded by a Member: "(a) deriving from international agreements on
judicial assistance and law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to
the protection of intellectual property; (b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the
Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be
a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country; (c) in
respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations
not provided under this Agreement; (d) deriving from international agreements related to the
protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and do not constitute an arbitrary or

unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other Members.").
41.
UNCTAD, MOST FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT - UNCTAD
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS VOL. 1115 (1999).
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Most agreements refer to "treatment no less favorable." NAFTA 4'2
and the U.S. Model BIT 3 include the qualification that such treatment
applies only "in like circumstances."" Many investment agreements entitle both foreign investors and their investments to MFN. Others (e.g.,
U.S. BITs) only grant MFN to the investment. Still another approach has
been followed in the French Model BIT, which gives MFN to the investors with regard to their investments.46
The vast majority of BITs does not include binding provisions relating to the pre-establishment (admission) phase, but only apply after an
investment has been made. Most BITs of the United States and some
recent treaties of Canada, however, require the application of the MFN
treatment to both the pre- and post-establishment phases.47
The MFN as applied to IPRs in the context of investment agreements
implies that any future concession made will apply to IPRs holders protected under current investment agreements, even if the latter provide for
narrower rights. In particular, the MFN clause may nullify the advantages obtained by specifying exceptions to certain rights in a particular
agreement, as investors may be able to invoke such a clause to claim
broader rights.
C. Fairand Equitable Treatment
The MFN clause sets forth a contingent, relative standard of investment protection. Many investment agreements also contain absolute
standards, 48 such as "reasonable" or "fair and equitable" treatment, 49 generally with regard to the post-establishment phase.
Though the wording of this standard is ambiguous and may allow
different interpretations, the standard provides a rule against which the
NAFTA, supra note 21, at art. 1103.
42.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 4.
43.
44.
Although GATr/WTO jurisprudence on "like goods" may illustrate how this issue
could be tackled, it does not provide concrete guidance for interpreting the "like circumstances" concept in the context of investment rules.
For examples, see NAFrA, supra note 21, and various BITs concluded by Germany,
45.
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
UNCTAD, supra note 41, at 6.
46.
See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 4.1.
47.
For a distinction between "relative" and "absolute" standards, see UNCTAD, supra
48.
note 14, at 182.
For example, the United States-El Salvador BIT provides that "each Party shall at
49.
all times accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security, and shall in no case accord treatment less favorable than that required by
international law." Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of El Salvador for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investment, Mar. 10, 1999, El Salvador-U.S., art. II.3(a), available at htsp:/
www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#ESV.
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policies and regulations of contracting parties would be judged. In some
cases, the provisions relating to "fair and equitable" treatment in investment agreements are supplemented by an obligation not to impair
investments by "unreasonable" and/or "discriminatory" measures. Under
the U.S. Model BIT, this principle is also meant to include the obligation
not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings "in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in
the principal legal systems of the world."50
Could a "fair and reasonable" standard be invoked in order to challenge national IPRs laws consistent with the TRIPS Agreement?
Investors are subject in each contracting party to the regulations and
policies generally applicable to the type of investment they hold or of
activity they undertake. As stated by one commentator in relation to the
draft OECD MAI, the "fair and equitable" standard cannot be deemed as
"designed to forbid any form of regulation against foreign investors, but
only discriminatory policies."5 In other words, this standard should not
be used to "challenge the legitimacy of a public action"5 2 or a regulation
connected with IPRs consistent with the applicable international rules as
well as with national laws if not discriminatory.
It is to be noted that differentiation in legal treatment is not the same as
discrimination,and that WTO members can adopt different rules for particular areas, provided that the differences are adopted for bona fide
purposes. A WTO panel held in this regard that:
Article 27 prohibits only discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported
or produced locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain
product areas. Moreover, to the extent the prohibition of discrimination does limit the ability to target certain products in
dealing with certain of the important national policies referred to
in Articles 7 and 8.1, that fact may well constitute a deliberate
limitation rather than frustration of purpose."
54
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
may be considered as authorizing differentiation in intellectual property
50.
51.

U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 5.2(a).
Valerie Charolles, Treatment of Investors and Their Investments: National Treat-

ment, Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, and Transparency, in THE
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 19.

MULTILATERAL

52.
Id.
53.
See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products: Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, Mar. 17, 2000, WTO Doc.
WT/DS I 14/R 7.92.
54.
Doha Declaration, supra note 13.
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rules if necessary to protect public health." Curiously, recent FTAs subscribed to by the United States reproduce only part of Article 27.1 and
omit the non-discrimination clause contained therein. 6 A possible explanation for this is that such treaties incorporate conditions that benefit, in
particular, pharmaceutical companies, such as restoration of the patent
term with respect to any pharmaceutical product to compensate the patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a
result of the marketing approval process.57 Similar rights are not available for patents covering agrochemical products or genetically modified
58
organisms, though they also require approval for commercialization.
D. Compulsory Licenses Under Investment Agreements
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was regarded by developing
countries as the end of a process of strengthening of IPRs protection.
They expected that in exchange for consenting to high IPRs standards,
they would be protected from unilateral actions and further demands of
increased levels of IPRs protection by rich countries. Shortly, after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, however, the European Union and the
United States continued to use various means to put pressure on developing countries not only to implement the TRIPS Agreement standards, but to
obtain "TRIPS-plus" protection, that is, levels of protection beyond the
minimum standards required by the TRIPS Agreement. Unilateral pressure
was exerted, for instance, by threatening the removal of trade preferences or cuts in development aid, or through simple moral persuasion. In
other cases, and without any assessment of its development implications,
including those implications for sensitive areas such as public health, developing countries have been persuaded to adopt "TRIPS-plus" standards
in order to benefit from other trade concessions under bilateral agreements.
The European Union promoted and signed a number of bilateral agreements expanding the protection of IPRs, while the United States did not
dismantle its controversial Special Section 301 of the Trade Act, 9 which
55.

See, e.g., CARLOS CORREA,

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE

TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 9, 18, 41(2002).

See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree56.
ment (CAFTA), art. 15.9.1, not yet in force, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/
CAFrA/CAFTADRe/CAFIADRine.asp.
57.
See, e.g., id. at art. 15.10.2.
58.
In the case of the approval of GMOs for food, for instance, the European Communities apply a de facto moratorium since 1998. See, e.g., Clear Labeling of GMOs, availableat,
http://www.elections2004.eu.int/highlights/en/709.html.
A WTO panel examined, in a case initiated by the EC and their Member States, the
59.
consistency with WTO obligations of the authorization given to the U.S. government to retaliate
under several provisions (such as "Special 301") of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19
U.S.C § 2114c(2)(A) (1984). Because of a commitment by the U.S. government not to apply
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empowers the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate cases even against
countries compliant with the TRIPS standards. 6°
Inherent to most intellectual property rights is the granting of exclusive rights. Exclusive rights give the right holder the legal power to
prevent third parties from using, producing, or commercializing the protected invention, sign, or work. Such power, however, is not absolute.
Exceptions to exclusive rights are a typical feature in intellectual property laws. They generally specify certain categories of acts that third
parties are allowed to undertake without the authorization of the right
holder. The permitted acts include, for instance, the use of an invention
for private purposes, for teaching, and for scientific research. In many
countries the experimentation for commercial purposes is an additional
permissible purpose. In the case of pharmaceutical patents, some countries specifically permit to initiate the procedures for the registration of a
medicine by a third party before the date of expiry of the respective patents, so as to speed up the commercialization of a generic product after
that date.61
These exceptions to exclusive rights operate automatically, that is,
there is no need to request authorization from a court or other authority
to use the protected subject matter. In addition, any party can benefit
from an exception at any time, and its application is not subject to any
compensation. States' right to establish exceptions of this type was recognized by the TRIPS Agreement.62
Compulsory licenses also limit the exercise of intellectual property
rights, but they do not work in the same way as the exceptions referred
to above. A compulsory license is an authorization given by the government for the use by a third party, without the consent of the right-owner, of
a patent or other intellectual property rights. A compulsory license allows
the use of protected subject matter, but only by the person who has been
so permitted by an authority (court or administration), after determination that certain requirements established by the law are met. Both the
request for a compulsory license and its use may be subject to time restrictions and other conditions, as well as to the payment of
compensation to the right holder.
sanctions without WTO authorization, the panel did not find a violation of WTO obligations. Panel
Report, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Dec. 22, 1999, VTO Doc.
WT/DS I52/R DSR2000:II, 815.
60.
See the "Special 301" section of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C
§ 2114c(2)(A) (1984).
61.
This exception is usually known as "early working" or the "Bolar exception." It was
first introduced by U.S. law in 1984. Cf with Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62.
See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at arts. 13, 17, 30.
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Governments may also decide to use a patented invention for noncommercial purposes, either by itself or through a subcontractor. The
non-commercial government use (hereinafter "government use") is comparable in many respects to compulsory licenses, but the procedures for
using the invention are simpler than in the case of a request of a compulsory license by a third party.
National patent laws63 of most countries in the world have recognized compulsory licenses for a multiplicity of purposes (such as
remedying non-working and other abuses, remedying anti-competitive
practices, public interest, emergency, public health, etc.). Some developing countries, however, have faced the threat of unilateral trade
retaliations or the suspension of foreign aid due to the adoption of rules
on compulsory licenses. Thee dispute between the United States and
South Africa relating to South African legislation on parallel imports and
compulsory licenses is one example of this6; the challenge launched by
the United States in January 2001 against Brazilian legislation, legislation that authorized the granting of compulsory licenses and parallel
imports in instances when patents are not worked domestically, is another.6 The dispute ended several months later 66 when the U.S. complaint
was withdrawn.67
The granting and effective exploitation of a compulsory license may
limit the economic benefits that the patent holder may obtain from his
"investment." An important question is whether the granting of a compulsory license may, under an investment agreement, be deemed an
expropriation that could trigger legal actions against the host State and
compensation claims.
Though the analysis in this paper is focused on patent law, many considerations
63.
made here apply, mutatis mutandi, to other fields where compulsory licenses are also provided
for, such as breeders' rights and copyright.
64.
See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

(2003).

65.
See Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 8, 2001). On
February 1, 2001, the DSB authorized establishment of a panel, although no panel members
had been appointed by the time the complaint was withdrawn.
66.
Without prejudice to their respective positions, the United States and Brazil agreed
to enter into bilateral discussions before Brazil makes use of Article 68 against a U.S. patent
holder. Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, WTO Doc.G/L/454, WTO Doc. IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19,
2001).
67.
Interestingly, BITs signed by the EFTA States recognize the legitimacy of compulsory licenses for non-working. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and
the Kingdom of Morocco, June 19, 1997, art. 3, available at http://secretariat.efta.int/
(providing that compulsory licenses
Web/ExtemalRelations/PartnerCountries/Morocco
"granted on the grounds of nonworking shall be used only to the extent necessary to satisfy
the domestic market on reasonable commercial terms").
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Expropriation clauses are among the key provisions in investment
agreements. The scope of these clauses is not limited only to direct and
full takings of property. For instance, the Germany - Bangladesh BIT
includes in its protocol, section 3, "the taking away or restrictingof any
property right which in itself or in conjunction with other rights constitutes an investment. '6' Article 42.1 of the EFTA-Singapore agreement
stipulates that "[n]one of the Parties shall take, either de jure or de facto,
measures of expropriation or nationalization against investments of investors of another Party.. .,,69 The U.S. Model BIT indicates that
"neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization. 7 °
A critical issue is to determine whether a compulsory license may be
deemed an expropriation. A compulsory license does not transfer the
property of the affected patent/s; it provides, as mentioned, an exception
to exclusive rights. The fact that no transfer of property takes place will
not be sufficient to disregard a possible qualification of expropriation.
For instance, "the slow and incremental encroachment on one or more of
the ownership rights of a foreign investor that diminishes the value of its
investment" (though the property remains vested in the foreign investor)
is often considered "creeping expropriation.,'
Can a compulsory license be considered a de facto or indirect expropriation?72 Compulsory licenses are not expressly intended to take
private property but may have an equivalent effect, that is, they may affect the viability or substantially diminish the value of the investment.
The determination of whether a measure amounts to a de facto or indirect expropriation must be made case-by-case. The mere fact that a
measure has an adverse economic effect on an investment, standing
alone, does not establish that a de facto or indirect expropriation has occulfed.73 Moreover, if the compulsory license is the development of the
68.
Germany-Bangladesh Bilateral Investment Agreement, May 6, 1981, prot. 3, Germany-Bangladesh, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_
bangladesh.pdf (emphasis added).
69.
EFTA-Singapore BIT, supra note 17. U.S. BITs also include a clause stipulating
that "neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of covered investments." See
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6.
70.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art 6.

71.

UNCTAD,

TAKING OF PROPERTY

12 (2000).

72.
NAFTA, for instance, prohibits three types of expropriation: direct expropriation,
indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation. NAFTA, supra note 21, at
art. 1110. The cases to date have held that these last two terms have the same meaning:
measures that do not directly take investment property, but which amount to the same thing.
IISD, supra note 27, at 31.
73.
See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at Ann. B, 4(a)(i).
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legitimate exercise of the State's regulatory power, there is no indication
that the measure has an illicit purpose or it is discriminatory, and compensation is available, then the measure could not be objected to. This
will be the case if the license is granted in accordance with Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
A compulsory license thus cannot be rightly described as an act of
expropriation. But the broad definition of "investment" and the coverage
of de facto expropriation may be used to raise an expropriation complaint in case a compulsory license were granted, and thereby challenge
the legitimacy of the grant or of the compensation established on the basis of rules applicable to compulsory licenses.
If such a claim were made, a first important issue would be to determine how the "public interest" would be defined. "Public interest" is a
concept broader than ordre public as utilized in the TRIPS Agreement
and many patent laws. The concept of ordre public covers the protection
of the public and of the physical integrity of individuals. It may also be
deemed to encompass the protection of the environment.74 Measures "in
the public interest" concern not only the protection of the public but any
actions that governments deem necessary or convenient to achieve public
policy objectives, in the area of health, education, etc. and, more broadly,
to foster economic and social development. 5
There may be little doubt that a compulsory license granted to address
a public health emergency or anti-competitive practices is "in the public
interest." Other grounds, such as the lack of or insufficient working of a
patent or refusal to deal, also reflect the "public interest." Allowing or enhancing competition and increasing the supply of a given product are
public interest objectives. Any ground defined by the national patent law76
for granting compulsory licenses should, as a matter of principle, be regarded as a matter of public interest in line with customary international
Frd~ric Pollaud-Dulian, La Brevetabilitg des Inventions: Etude Comparative de
74.
Jurisprudence, 16 LE DROIT DES AFFAIRES 173 (1997).
75.
NAFTA jurisprudence has diluted, however, the importance of the purpose of the
measure that affects an investment. In Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 16 ICSID
Rev.-FILJ 168, para. 103 (2001), the tribunal considered only the scale of impact of the challenged measure on an investment and whether there was a significant impact on "the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property, even if not necessarily to the obvious
benefit of the host State." The same approach is developed in the Pope Talbot v. Canada decision. See IISD, supra note 27, at 32.
It is to be noted, in this context, that the TRIPS Agreement does not restrict the
76.
grounds for the granting of compulsory licenses. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31.
Bilateral agreements, such as the United States-Jordan BIT, however, do restrict the admissible grounds for granting such licenses. Treaty Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, July 2, 1997, art. 4.20, U.S.-Jordan,
availableat http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usjordan.pdf.
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law. A host country's determination of what is in the public interest or a
public purpose is seldom challenged in expropriation cases. 77
There will be no discrimination if a patent or set of patents are singled out for the granting of a compulsory license because, by its very
essence, a patent covers a unique process or product. Discrimination
complaints may be raised, however, with regard to due process and payment of compensation.
If expropriation rules were applicable to cases of compulsory licenses, a further question would be whether the patent owner could as an
"investor" claim compensation different from or in addition to the one
provided for by the patent law, presumably in line with Article 31 (h) of
the TRIPS Agreement.
The compensation that the patent owner may receive under compulsory licenses rules should be "adequate" in "the circumstances of each
case" and would be determined on the basis of the "economic value" of
the license .79 The compensation is to be paid by the compulsory licensee
or, in the case of non-commercial use, by the government. In the case of
expropriation, the compensation should be, in accordance with the Hull
standard incorporated by most investment agreements, "prompt, adequate, and effective,"8 and is payable by the government.
If the patent owner is compensated according to the current economic value of the license, however, the compensation would be
"adequate" and it is difficult to conceive that the patent owner could succeed in a claim about adequateness. In fact, the extent to which a
compulsory license may diminish the value of the patent will depend on
a variety of factors." Loss of value will not be automatic, and may not
occur at all if compulsory licenses increase the global demand for the
patented product, or if the royalties received compensate for the losses
originated by the compulsory licensee's competition. Compulsory licenses must be non-exclusive 2; this means that the patent owner can
77.
UNCTAD, supra note 71, at 13, 25.
78.
Id. at 13.
79.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31 (h).
80.
According to the current U.S. Model BIT, for instance, compensation shall "(a) be
paid without delay; (b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place ... and (d) be fully realizable and freely
transferable[ ....
] The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended appropriation had become known earlier" U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at
art. 6.2.
81.
In Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, the tribunal noted that "not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particular
business, change in the law or change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110 [of
NAFTA]... "Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, 18 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 488, para. 112 (2003).
82.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 3 1(d).
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continue with the exploitation of the invention and can compete, as aggressively as it wishes, with the compulsory licensee, with the
advantages conferred by the prestige of brand names and generally
abundant resources for marketing. In fact, the market share that compulsory licensees may obtain may be small and even insignificant, on
account of the reputation and dominant presence of the patent owner in
the market.83 Moreover, given the characteristics of competition in some
markets such as, for example, pharmaceuticals, high-priced brand-name
goods (e.g., medicines) often perform commercially better than their
low-priced equivalents.
Licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices are subject to special
treatment with regard to the remuneration to be paid to the patent-holder.
Article 31 (k) may be interpreted by national authorities as allowing for
a reduced remuneration, as established in some cases in the United
States.M It is also to be noted that a taking or expropriation "in response
to a violation of penal or other laws of a host country is legitimate and is
not compensable, as compensation will negate the punitive purpose behind such takings."85
While it may be difficult to make arguments about adequateness if
the TRIPS standards are complied with, more controversial may be an
argument about promptness because, in practice, the compensation for a
compulsory license has been generally established in the form of a roy86
alty payable over time as sales of the licensed product take place. The
standard of prompt compensation, however, may be interpreted as requiring payment without unreasonable delay, but not necessarily an upfront payment.
Finally, the procedures for granting a compulsory license should ensure the patent owner at least the right to appeal the validity of the
decision granting the license and the determination of the compensation.87 If such appeal is provided for, it may be difficult to substantiate a
complaint about due process.
The possibility of challenging compulsory licenses on the basis of
investors' rights has been anticipated by some agreements. For instance,
the FTA between Chile and the United States stipulates that the provision on expropriation and compensation:

Jayashree Watal, PharmaceuticalPatents, Prices, and Welfare Losses: Policy Op83.
tions for India Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, in 23 THE WORLD ECON., 733 (May, 2000).
See, e.g., SOL GOLDSTEIN, A STUDY OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 124 (1977).
84.
UNCTAD, supra note 71, at 14.
85.
The payment of a lump sum, however, is in no way excluded as a possible form of
86.
remuneration.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31(i)-(j).
87.
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does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in
relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the
TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such revocation,
limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property Rights).
The incorporation of this provision confirms that expropriation rules are
potentially applicable to the granting of compulsory licenses. An exception of this type is also contained in the U.S. Model BIT. 9
IV. CONCLUSION

Intellectual property rights, registered or not, are protected investments under BITs and trade agreements that incorporate rules on
investment. This adds another layer of treaty-based protection onto rights
protected under the TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions. But this protection goes beyond TRIPS, because investment
agreements apply to rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement and
incorporate the national treatment principle clause without the exceptions provided for under IPR treaties.
It is unclear the extent to which rights granted by investment agreements may be used to substantiate claims in the area of IPRs. An area of
particular concern may be the granting of compulsory licenses, because
the patent owner would be normally able to claim an economic loss, despite the fact that the patent rights will continue in force and that he will
be able to compete with the compulsory licensees.
Expropriation rules, if found applicable to a compulsory license,
may be more beneficial to the patent owner than the compulsory licenses
rules, particularly because the obligation to pay will rest with the government and because investment agreements normally provide for the
investor's right to directly sue the State.
Though it may be difficult for an affected patent owner to claim that
an illegal expropriation has taken place if the rules of the TRIPS Agreement (notably Article 31) were complied with, cases may arise in which
claims of this type could be made (for instance, when a patent owner
were dissatisfied with the determination of the level or mode of compensation). Given the gray area that overlapping protections create,
investor's rights may be used to dissuade governments from using compulsory licenses. It would seem, therefore, advisable in investment
88.
89.

Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 34, at art. 10.9.5.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 6.5.
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agreements to provide specifically for an exception stipulating that compulsory licenses are not subject to expropriation and compensation rules,
and to ensure that the application of that exception is not excluded or
undermined by rights conferred under the MFN clause.

